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The funeral of Margaret Thatcher, the former British Prime Minister, is due to be held in London today.
Reassessing her impact on Britain’s relationship with Europe, Iain Begg argues that she
maintained a far more nuanced position on Europe than is commonly recognised. The image of a
staunchly Eurosceptic Prime Minister is at odds with her support for the single European market and
her assertion, in her 1988 Bruges speech, that the UK’s destiny is to be inside the European
Community.
Margaret Thatcher is seen today as having been staunchly Eurosceptic and to have been hostile to
the European ‘project’. Her Bruges speech in 1988 is widely cited as having articulated a vision for
Europe that was incompatible with what other Member States wanted, notably the statement that ‘we have not
successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a
European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.’ This is widely interpreted to be anti-federalist and
hostile to the centralisation of power promoted by Jacques Delors, the then President of the European Commission.
Yet a dispassionate assessment of her relations with the
European Union reveals a much more nuanced picture. Even
in the Bruges speech, she repeatedly stresses the importance
for Europe of ‘trying to speak with one voice’ and argued that
‘Europe is stronger’ when it works together in areas such as
trade or defence. In a sentence that anticipated the demise of
Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, she also reminds her
audience, to ‘look on Warsaw, Prague and Budapest as great
European cities’.
Certainly, in the end, it was Europe that led directly to her
downfall in November 1990. She had been increasingly at
odds with senior members of her government over the
direction UK policy should take towards monetary integration.
A running battle between her own economic adviser, Alan
Walters, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson
over exchange rate policy culminated in both resigning in
October 1989. The UK subsequently joined the EU’s exchange
rate mechanism in October 1990, a decision that she was
reported to have been unable to resist, partly because her
political stock had fallen as a result of opposition to her plans
for a poll tax.
Barely a month later, she returned from a European summit meeting in Madrid that had been discussing plans for
monetary union and made what became one of her most iconic speeches in the House of Commons. ‘No, no, no’,
she said, to the visible dismay of Geoffrey Howe, the deputy Prime Minister, and one of her most senior and
previously loyal supporters. He then also resigned and made what was one of the most devastating resignation
speeches, which precipitated Thatcher’s fall from power.
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Yet there is considerable irony in the fact that the European Union of today has been substantially shaped by Mrs
Thatcher’s policies. It is, first, easily forgotten that she was a minister in the government that took the UK into
Europe in 1973, and that she subsequently campaigned on the ‘yes’ side in the referendum held in 1975 to validate
UK membership of the then European Economic Community.
The Thatcher government was, moreover, one of the leading supporters of the single European market that was
progressively put in place from the mid-1980s. Indeed, the European Commissioner who led the programme to
complete the internal market, Lord Cockfield, was a Thatcher appointee who clearly shared her views on the
importance of market principles. It could be that one of her most enduring legacies is the unwavering support for the
single market as the cornerstone of European integration, despite the turmoil of recent years, and the wave of
market-orientated  reforms across the continent.
It has become part of the Thatcher myth that she never quite understood what she had signed up for in the Single
European Act of 1986, and did not foresee the regulatory measures that would be imposed by ‘Brussels’ on an
unsuspecting Britain. In his contribution to the valedictory debate in the House of Commons last week, Sir Tony
Baldry M.P. commented that ‘while Margaret had succeeded in making the single market work much better, she was
no longer able as easily to threaten to exercise a UK veto, and I think in time she found that very frustrating’. Maybe
so, but it is hard to believe that someone so meticulous in her work would make such a blunder. One of her former
private secretaries once told the story of her running down the stairs at 10 Downing Street, waving a copy of the Act,
saying ‘I’ve read it; I’ve read every word’.
Similarly, the fact that the EU enlarged to bring in ten countries from central and eastern Europe, with another
(Croatia) due to join later this year, is at least in part a result of the approach the Thatcher government took to
confronting the Soviet Union and ending the cold war. It is no coincidence that some of the warmest eulogies for Mrs
Thatcher last week came from ordinary citizens in countries like Poland. Paradoxically, she (along with François
Mitterrand, the French President), resisted the unification of Germany, and comments following her death from the
then German leader, Helmut Kohl, testify to the friction this caused.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Mrs Thatcher made life difficult in many ways for her fellow European leaders, often
blocking what others regarded as necessary changes. From a UK perspective, she secured a considerable success
in renegotiating the European budget to secure ‘my money back’ in 1984 through a rebate. But the outcome has
been that EU budget negotiations are now one of the most difficult of all, and that the EU budget is so resistant to
reform that it does not fulfil an effective role in European economic governance.
Domestically, in the years that followed her ‘political assassination’, the schism over Europe haunted the
Conservative party, although it remained in government until 1997. Political disputes over Europe continued to
divide the government of Thatcher’s successor, John Major, who was once memorably described by Norman
Lamont, the Chancellor who presided over Britain’s ejection from the exchange rate mechanism in September 1992,
as ‘being in office but not in power’.
Even today, much of the debate on Britain’s place in Europe is influenced by the Thatcher legacy and many now
either fear or hope that the forces she unleashed will lead to Britain leaving the EU. Yet both sides overlook a key
sentence in the Bruges speech: ‘Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community.’
This article was first published in the ‘European Observation’ column of the Oriental Morning Post .
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Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
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